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The Rehnquist Court and the Groundwork for Greater 
First Amendment Scrutiny of Intellectual Property†  
Mark P. McKenna*  
I. THE REHNQUIST COURT’S IP/FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
In the last few years, many pages have been devoted to 
retrospectives on Justice Rehnquist and the Rehnquist Court,1 a fair 
number of which focused on Justice Rehnquist’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence.2 I focus here not on Justice Rehnquist specifically, but 
on the Supreme Court as a whole during Rehnquist’s tenure. 
Specifically, I want to address the Court’s view of the role of the First 
Amendment in intellectual property cases. My thesis is a modest one: 
while one certainly cannot describe the Rehnquist Court as eager to 
find a conflict between intellectual property laws and the First 
Amendment, there is reason to believe that it set the stage for greater 
First Amendment scrutiny of intellectual property protections. At the 
very least, the Court left that road open to future courts, which might 
be inclined to view intellectual property more skeptically.  
This conclusion is not, I admit, one that leaps from the pages of 
the Supreme Court’s decisions. In fact, if we look only at the 
intellectual property cases the Rehnquist Court decided at least in part 
on First Amendment grounds, we have very little to work with. By 
my count, the Court decided only four intellectual property cases 
even partially on First Amendment grounds during Rehnquist’s 
 
 † ©2006 Mark P. McKenna, mckennam@slu.edu.  
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. 
 1. See THE REHNQUIST LEGACY (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006); John O. McGinnis, 
Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002); Symposium, The Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 2. Some of that discussion has not been charitable. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, The 
Hustler: Justice Rehnquist and “the Freedom of Speech, or of the Press,” in THE REHNQUIST 
LEGACY, supra note 1, at 11, 12 (arguing that “relative to his colleagues, Rehnquist was no 
friend of the First Amendment”). 
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tenure on the Court,3 five if you count product disparagement as an 
intellectual property claim.4 The Court decided only two of those 
cases while Justice Rehnquist served as Chief Justice.  
There is some irony in this lack of precedent. A good deal of 
modern intellectual property scholarship focuses on the conflict 
between intellectual property protection and First Amendment values 
and related concepts such as “semiotic democracy.”5 The Supreme 
Court, however, appears not to have taken these commentators’ 
concerns terribly seriously. Moreover, the Court’s inattention to First 
Amendment concerns cannot be attributed to a lack of interest in 
intellectual property generally; the Court decided forty-seven 
intellectual property-related cases during Rehnquist’s tenure on the 
 
 3. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (considering the constitutionality of the 
Copyright Term Extension Act); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522 (1987) (dealing with statutory protection of “Olympic” as a quasi-trademark); Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (addressing whether parody can 
constitute fair use under the Copyright Act); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 
562 (1977) (dealing with a right of publicity claim under Ohio law). 
 4. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Product disparagement, or 
“trade libel” as it is sometimes called, traditionally was regarded as a tort, see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 623A–52, but commentators have suggested that Congress enacted 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to cover trade libel and product disparagement when it passed 
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935. See 2 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:9 (4th ed. 
2005). 
 5. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (arguing that 
technological changes require “free speech values—interactivity, mass participation, and the 
ability to modify and transform culture—[to] be protected through technological design and 
through administrative and legislative regulation of technology, as well as through the more 
traditional method of judicial creation and recognition of constitutional rights”); see also 
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that “copying is good” and noting the 
impact on First Amendment freedoms of narrowing fair use defense). The term “semiotic 
democracy” comes from John Fiske, who used the term to describe popular participation in 
cultural meaning making, which can be frustrated by intellectual property law. JOHN FISKE, 
TELEVISION CULTURE 95, 236–39 (1987); see also William W. Fisher III, Property and 
Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1217 (1998) (“In an attractive society, all 
persons would be able to participate in the process of meaning-making. Instead of being merely 
passive consumers of cultural artifacts produced by others, they would be producers, helping to 
shape the world of ideas and symbols in which they live.”); Michael Madow, Private 
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 146 
(1993) (defining semiotic democracy as “a society in which all persons are free and able to 
participate actively, if not equally, in the generation and circulation of meanings and values”). 
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Court, and twenty-six during his tenure as Chief Justice.6 To put this 
 
 6. The cases, in reverse chronological order, are: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (holding that one who distributes a device with the 
object of promoting its use to infringe a copyright is liable for the resulting acts of infringement 
by third parties); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 
(2004) (holding that a defendant asserting fair use under the Lanham Act need not prove 
absence of any likelihood of confusion to sustain defense); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (rejecting false designation of origin claim based on 
copying of public domain work without attribution); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 
U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires a showing of actual 
dilution); Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (upholding constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension 
Act of 1998); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) 
(considering the question of when prosecution history estoppel applies to bar claim of 
infringement under doctrine of equivalents); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 
Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (holding that newly developed plant breeds are patentable subject 
matter); New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding that databases containing 
individual articles taken from periodicals were not reproduced and distributed “as part of” 
“revisions” of periodical issues and therefore could not be relicensed by owner of copyright in 
collective work); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001) 
(dealing with the constitutionality of a punitive damages award on a false advertising claim); 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (holding that existence of 
expired utility patent covering product is strong evidence that the design is functional); Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (holding that a product design is 
entitled to protection as unregistered trade dress only if it has acquired a secondary meaning); 
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) 
(holding that state sovereign immunity was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy 
Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the State’s activities in interstate commerce); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) 
(invalidating the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act’s purported 
abrogation of sovereign immunity); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (holding that 
commercial marketing of invention triggers on-sale bar under the Patent Act, even if invention 
was not actually reduced to practice); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 
340 (1998) (holding that Copyright Act does not grant right to have jury assess statutory 
damages, but the Seventh Amendment provides the right to jury trial on all issues pertinent to 
statutory damages); Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 
(1998) (holding that the first sale doctrine under Copyright Act is applicable to imported 
copies); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (reaffirming 
validity of doctrine of equivalents and outlining standards for application); Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that color alone may serve as a trademark if 
it has acquired secondary meaning); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) 
(holding that 2 Live Crew’s adaptation of Roy Orbison’s Pretty Woman was a parody protected 
by fair use doctrine); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (holding that prevailing 
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants must be treated alike in awarding attorneys’ fees under 
Copyright Act); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (holding that 
inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable under the Lanham Act without showing that it 
has acquired secondary meaning); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991) (holding that facts are not copyrightable and that alphabetical arrangement of white page 
listings lacked the requisite originality for copyright protection); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (holding that the use of a patented invention to develop and submit 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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information for marketing approval of medical devices under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act was not infringement); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (considering 
renewal rights of the statutory successors of a deceased author); Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (articulating standard for determining when a work 
should be considered a “work for hire” under the Copyright Act); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (finding Florida statute prohibiting use of the direct 
molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls or knowing sale of hulls preempted by 
Supremacy Clause); S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. 522 (finding, among other things, that the 
First Amendment did not prohibit Congress from granting exclusive use of the word “Olympic” 
to the U.S. Olympic Committee); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (holding that magazine’s 
unauthorized publication of quotes from President Ford’s unpublished memoirs was not a “fair 
use” within meaning of Copyright Act); Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 
189 (1985) (holding that descriptiveness defense is unavailable to defendant when plaintiff’s 
trademark has become incontestable under Lanham Act); Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 
153 (1985) (dealing with effect of termination on pre-termination grant of right to create 
derivative work); Bose, 466 U.S. 485 (applying actual malice standard of New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to product disparagement claim, and subjecting lower court’s 
decision to standard of “convincing clarity”); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that manufacturers of multipurpose equipment cannot be secondarily 
liable for users copyright infringements as long as the equipment is capable of substantial non-
infringing uses); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982) (dealing with the 
vicarious liability of a manufacturer under the Lanham Act where a third party mislabeled the 
manufacturer’s generic drug with the competitor’s registered trademark) ; Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175 (1981) (finding that while a mathematical formula by itself is not patentable, a 
developed process containing the mathematical formula is patentable); Dawson Chem. Co. v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (finding a patent holder’s suit to prevent contributory 
infringement by the party selling an herbicide with instructions for applying it by the patented 
method did not amount to patent misuse); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
(finding living matter patentable as long as it is the product of human invention); Broad. Music, 
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (finding that the issuance of blanket 
licenses by licensing agencies for composers, writers, and publishers did not constitute price 
fixing that was per se unlawful under the antitrust laws); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 
440 U.S. 257 (1979) (finding that federal patent law does not preempt state contract law); 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (finding that when the only new feature of a process is a 
mathematical formula, the new or improved process is not patentable subject matter); Zacchini, 
433 U.S. 562 (dealing with a right of publicity claim under Ohio law); Dann v. Johnston, 425 
U.S. 219 (1976) (holding that a “machine system for automatic record-keeping of bank checks 
and deposits” was unpatentable on grounds of obviousness); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (finding that a restaurant owner who presented music to his 
customers by the use of a radio and ceiling loudspeakers did not infringe on the copyright 
holders’ exclusive right to perform the copyrighted musical works publicly for profit); Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding that Ohio’s law of trade secrets was not 
preempted by the patent laws of the United States); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. 
Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (dealing with an infringement claim for the interception of 
broadcast transmissions of copyrighted television programs); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 
546 (1973) (dealing with the constitutionality of a California statute criminalizing the offense of 
‘pirating’ recordings produced by others); United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 
(1973) (holding that where patents were directly involved in antitrust violations, the 
Government could challenge the patents’ validity even though the owner did not rely on the 
patents in defending the antitrust claim); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (finding that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/3
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in perspective, the Court decided only thirteen intellectual property 
cases during the twenty years before Rehnquist was confirmed.7  
Many of the intellectual property cases the Court decided while 
Rehnquist served were quite significant. And while the Court during 
that period cannot be characterized as hostile to intellectual property 
protection,8 it took positions in many of these cases that restricted the 
scope of intellectual property laws. For example, the Court relied on 
 
a certain computer program was a mathematical formula and thus was not patentable subject 
matter). As with any such collection of cases, the number is subject to some subjective 
assessment because some of these cases deal with intellectual property issues more squarely 
than others. For example, I count Bose, 466 U.S. 485, as an intellectual property case because it 
involved a product disparagement claim, which is a form of unfair competition claim. See supra 
note 4. I recognize that others would not count this case, though it is interesting in that it 
accepted without deciding that the New York Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard applied to 
a claim of product disparagement based on a critical product review. Justice Rehnquist called it 
“ironic” that the New York Times v. Sullivan test, which originated “because of the need for 
freedom to criticize the conduct of public officials,” was applied to a “magazine’s false 
statements about a commercial loudspeaker system.” Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 7. Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969) 
(considering whether a patent was invalid for obviousness); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 
(1969) (holding that a patent licensee is not estopped from challenging patent validity); 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (interpreting 
performance right under Copyright Act); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 
386 U.S. 714 (1967) (determining availability of attorneys’ fees in trademark infringement 
litigation under Lanham Act); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (interpreting 
nonobviousness requirement of Patent Act); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 
(1964) (finding state law unfair competition claim preempted by Patent Act where state law 
claim targets copying itself); Pub. Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111 (1962) 
(addressing but declining to determine the copyrightability of speeches by public employee); 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (finding replacement 
of a spent unpatented element of a combination to constitute permissible repair and not 
reconstruction); Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960) 
(interpreting statutory renewal rights of deceased composer); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 
570 (1956) (determining interests in statutory renewal rights of author’s widow and illegitimate 
child); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (considering copyrightability of works of applied 
art); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (determining whether a District Court 
has jurisdiction to award relief to an American corporation for trademark infringements 
consummated in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States); F.W. 
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952) (determining appropriate 
damages for copyright infringement). 
 8. Some of the Rehnquist Court’s intellectual property decisions were quite expansionist. 
See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (upholding constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension 
Act of 1998); Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159 (holding that color alone may serve as a trademark 
provided that it has acquired secondary meaning); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 763 (holding that 
inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable under the Lanham Act without showing that it 
has acquired secondary meaning); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (holding that living matter may 
be patentable as long as it is the result of human invention). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p11 McKenna book pages.doc  10/31/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 21:11 
 
 
copyright law’s fair use doctrine to protect parodies9 and on other 
doctrinal constraints, such as the originality requirement, to limit the 
scope of copyright protection.10 The Court has similarly relied on 
internal constraints of patent law to limit its scope, including twice 
revisiting and recognizing the doctrine of prosecution history 
estoppel, which limits the range of equivalents a patentee may claim 
as infringing his or her patent.11  
Some of these “restrictionist” results can be explained simply as 
the result of strict constructions of the governing statutes.12 
Frequently, however, the Court’s positions have been motivated at 
least in part by concerns about the effect of excessive protection on 
the policies underlying other statutory regimes, or on competition 
more generally. Several recent cases reflect a particular concern 
about trademark law trenching on areas traditionally reserved to 
patent and copyright law.13 In TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing 
Displays, Inc., for example, the Court adopted a somewhat broader 
definition of functionality than appellate courts had been using, 
concluding that a product feature need not be a competitive necessity 
to be deemed functional.14 Instead, a product feature should be 
deemed functional, and therefore unable to serve as a trademark, if it 
affects “the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or 
quality of the article.”15 Moreover, largely because of concerns about 
the potential for trade dress protection to extend the patent period, the 
Court held that expired utility patents give rise to a strong 
presumption of functionality.16  
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the Court 
showed similar a concern about trademark law interfering with the 
balance struck by copyright law.17 In Dastar, the Court refused to 
 
 9. See Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569. 
 10. See Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. 340 (holding that facts are not copyrightable and that 
alphabetical arrangement of white page listings lacked the requisite originality for copyright 
protection).  
 11. See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722; Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. 17. 
 12. See KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. 111; Moseley, 537 U.S. 418. 
 13. See Dastar, 539 U.S. 23; TrafFix, 532 U.S. 23; Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. 205. 
 14. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32–33. 
 15. Id. at 32 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). 
 16. Id. at 34–35. 
 17. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32–35. 
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allow a false designation of origin claim against a party that 
reproduced material in the public domain and failed to attribute the 
content to the copyright holder.18 Though to reach its result the Court 
employed a somewhat tortured definition of “origin,” the key 
statutory term, it clearly was concerned that allowing a false 
designation of origin claim in this context would amount to backdoor 
protection of content. Justice Scalia noted that allowing the claim 
would “create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the 
public’s federal right to copy and to use expired copyrights.”19  
The Court has even expressed constitutional objections to the 
application of intellectual property laws. In Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,20 
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, invalidated the Patent 
Act’s purported abrogation of state sovereign immunity, leaving 
states and their instrumentalities, including state universities with 
large technology transfer offices, immune from infringement 
lawsuits.21 
So what can be said of the Rehnquist Court’s treatment of 
intellectual property? It has on several occasions seen good reason to 
limit the scope of intellectual property protection to prevent its 
encroachment on other values. But the Court has not been convinced 
that intellectual property laws inappropriately burden free speech.In 
Eldred v. Ashcroft,22 the Court’s only decision squarely considering a 
First Amendment objection to copyright law,23 the Court was quite 
dismissive of any potential conflict between copyright and the First 
Amendment.24 In fact, the Eldred decision seems to have placed 
copyright predominantly outside the First Amendment scheme, at 
 
 18. Id. at 37–38. 
 19. Id. at 34 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 20. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 
(1999). 
 21. Id. 
 22. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 23. Specifically, Eldred involved a challenge to extension of the copyright term by the 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998. 
 24. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–22. 
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least as long as Congress does not alter the “traditional contours of 
copyright protection.”25  
II. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT THE IP/FIRST AMENDMENT 
INTERFACE 
The Supreme Court’s disinterest in intellectual property’s impact 
on free speech interests is consistent with courts’ general 
disinclination towards seeing First Amendment problems in 
intellectual property cases.26 Indeed, the conventional wisdom holds 
that copyright law, through its internal limiting mechanisms such as 
the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense, adequately 
protects First Amendment values.27 The Supreme Court clearly 
embraced the notion that the fair use defense provides sufficient First 
Amendment protection in Harper & Row,28 and it emphasized 
copyright’s internal safeguards in reaching its decision in Eldred.29 
The appellate courts also seem to have been convinced that 
 
 25. Id. at 221 (“The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline 
to make—one’s own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other 
people’s speeches.”). For a persuasive critique of the Court’s reasoning, see Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment; What Eldred Misses—And Portends, in 
COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 127, 136–39 
(Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005). 
 26. See Netanel, supra note 25, at 128 (“Courts have almost never imposed First 
Amendment limitations on copyright, and most have summarily rejected First Amendment 
defences to copyright infringement claims.”). Netanel suggests that this reluctance is relatively 
unique to copyright law, and that courts have been more interested in First Amendment 
implications of other forms of intellectual property. See id. at 129–30. As a relative matter, 
Netanel is probably right, but courts only seem more concerned in those areas by comparison to 
copyright, where they have exhibited virtually no concern. Courts’ inattention to First 
Amendment issues, as Eugene Volokh has said, is “unfortunate, because most intellectual 
property rules—copyright law, trademark law, right of publicity law, and trade secret law—are 
speech restrictions: They keep people from publishing, producing, and performing the speech 
that they want to publish, produce, and perform.” Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and 
Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 697, 698 (2003).  
 27. See Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 
40 HOUS. L. REV. 673, 676 (2003). Yen cites several cases that make claims about copyright’s 
internal protections of First Amendment values. See id. n.11. 
 28. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) 
(accepting that copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy “strike[s] a definitional balance between 
the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while 
still protecting an author’s expression”) (internal citations omitted). 
 29. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–22. 
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copyright’s internal safeguards are sufficient: as far as I have been 
able to determine, no federal court of appeals has ever held that the 
First Amendment provides a defense distinct from the traditional 
“fair use” defense of copyright law. 
Courts have been somewhat less willing to assert that there is no 
separate First Amendment defense to trademark infringement. In fact, 
some appellate courts have held that trademark law’s likelihood of 
confusion test does not sufficiently protect First Amendment 
interests.30 But those examples are the exception. In most of the cases 
that have involved serious conflicts with free speech, courts have 
found or created tools within trademark law to avoid explicit 
engagement of the First Amendment.31 Prior to the Supreme Court’s 
definitive pronouncement last term,32 for example, many courts 
insisted that fair use could not be found unless the defendant could 
show that there was no likelihood of consumer confusion, essentially 
subsuming fair use within the traditional infringement test.33 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s decision in KP Permanent, 
which repudiated that view, was rendered purely on statutory 
grounds. Thus the fact remains that the Supreme Court has never 
decided a trademark case on First Amendment grounds, even though 
many trademark cases in lower courts during the Rehnquist years 
raised serious First Amendment issues.34  
 
 30. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting approach 
taken by other circuits that gave no special treatment to expressive works, and following, at 
least superficially, the Rogers v. Grimaldi test); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989) (adopting a test that protects from liability a defendant who uses a trademark as the title 
of an expressive work, unless the title has no artistic relevance or is explicitly misleading).  
 31. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A), (C) (2006) (providing defenses to federal 
dilution cause of action for comparative advertising and news reporting); Century 21 Real 
Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (recognizing nominative fair use 
defense); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(articulating nominative fair use defense in part to protect First Amendment interests).  
 32. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004). 
 33. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998). 
McCarthy holds a similar view with respect to parody, concluding that “parody is no ‘defense’ 
to a likelihood of confusion,” but “merely a way of phrasing the traditional response that 
customers are not likely to be confused as to source, sponsorship or approval.” 5 J.T. 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:153 (4th ed. 
1996). 
 34. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995); Roy Exp. Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 
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One of the few areas of intellectual property in which the Supreme 
Court has recognized an explicit role for the First Amendment is the 
right of publicity, which the Court addressed in 1977 in Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.35 Not surprisingly, however, even 
though it recognized that free speech interests were at issue, the Court 
ultimately rejected the defendant’s First Amendment defense.36 This 
decision has been severely, and I think rightly, criticized both on 
right of publicity and First Amendment grounds.37 Some appellate 
courts recently have picked up on this criticism and have subjected 
right of publicity claims to greater First Amendment scrutiny,38 but 
the Supreme Court has never considered another right of publicity 
case.39  
 
F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 
581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 35. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 36. Zacchini was a circus performer whose entire act (which was only a few seconds long 
and consisted of being shot out of a cannon) was shown on a local news program. Zacchini 
sued, claiming a violation of his right of publicity, despite what appeared to be classic 
noncommercial use by the defendants. The Court concluded that the use was not 
noncommercial, because it might negatively affect Zacchini’s ability to generate money for his 
performance. See id. at 563–64, 575–76. 
 37. See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 225, 251 n.122 (2005) (noting that the Court conflated performance value and the 
value of Zacchini’s personality and that it inverted the traditional analysis of whether the use 
was commercial by focusing on the impact of the use on the plaintiff’s market rather than on the 
nature of the defendant’s use). 
 38. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 335 F.3d 1161 (10th 
Cir. 2003) (concluding that Oklahoma would recognize a fair use defense to state law right of 
publicity claim that would shield the defendant’s parody baseball cards); ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding defendant’s limited edition print featuring 
Tiger Woods to be non-infringing fair use and thus entitled to First Amendment protection from 
plaintiff’s trademark and right of publicity claims). 
 39. Like in the trademark area, the Court’s refusal to address First Amendment 
implications of the right of publicity was not for lack of opportunity. See Doe v. TCI 
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, McFarlane v. Twist, 540 U.S. 
1106 (2004) (denying certiorari in case in which former hockey player asserted right of 
publicity claim based on the use for a character in a comic book of a name similar to his). 
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III. SOME DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY AFFECT THE CONVENTIONAL 
WISDOM 
A. Increasing Numbers of IP Events 
This story of reluctance to find First Amendment problems in 
intellectual property cases is not a heartening one for those who see 
significant conflict in these types of cases. But there are reasons to 
believe that courts might someday change their tune. As others have 
observed, the Eldred opinion itself leaves the door open, ever so 
slightly, for challenges to legislation that alters the “traditional 
contours of copyright protection.”40 And at least three other 
developments may contribute to a change in the legal landscape.  
First, increasing adoption and use of digital technologies has led 
to a rise in the number of “IP events.”41 In some cases, these events 
have raised new and different types of legal issues, or at least have 
changed the nature of old issues so substantially as to require new 
rules. For example, the VCR enabled users to time-shift an, in 
addition to raising the question of whether such activity was 
infringing, forced the Court to consider when the manufacturer of 
such a multipurpose device, capable of both infringing and non-
infringing uses, might be held secondarily liable for infringing uses 
by its customers.42 Similarly, filesharing software significantly 
complicated analysis of the Audio Home Recording Act’s provision 
allowing noncommercial copying.43  
 
 40. See Netanel, supra note 25, at 144–47 (using the Digital Millenium Copyright Act’s 
anti-circumvention provisions, which forbid access itself, as a possibly objectionable provision 
even after Eldred); Yen, supra note 27, at 685–86 (noting that, after the Eldred decision, a 
copyright regime with appropriate limits largely escapes scrutiny, but one without such limits is 
subject to constitutional doubt).  
 41. I draw the term “IP events” from Michael Carroll, who has identified an explosion of 
“copyright events” that digital technologies have let loose. See Michael W. Carroll, Creative 
Commons and the New Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (defining a “copyright event” 
as “any action in the world that entails the exercise of one or more of a copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights to copy, distribute, perform, display or adapt information”). As Carroll 
explains, not all copyright events are infringing, but all implicate copyright law. 
 42. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 43. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing application of AHRA to Napster’s filesharing software, and concluding that the file 
exchange was not the type of “noncommercial use” protected from infringement and that the 
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What distinguishes modern technology from prior technological 
advancements that affected the copyright system, however, is that 
digital technology has made possible and visible certain uses with 
offline analogs that were traditionally considered outside the ambit of 
intellectual property protection or, at least, were unlikely to be 
noticed by intellectual property owners.44 As Lawrence Lessig 
explained, the architecture of the offline world made enforcement of 
intellectual property rights against a large number of private 
individuals inefficient; as a result, individuals were practically free to 
make a variety of technically infringing uses of copyrighted 
material.45 Digital technologies upset this equilibrium, making many 
creative uses of copyrighted material not only easier to disseminate 
but much more visible to copyright owners. As a result, intellectual 
property owners now are able to pursue a variety of uses that before 
would have gone unnoticed. Because many of those uses are private, 
non-commercial uses, it seems very likely that many of these cases 
will implicate speech interests more directly than the average cases 
did in the analog era. 
B. Fair Use and First Amendment Values Are Diverging 
The second development is internal to copyright law. In those 
cases in which the Court has been faced with First Amendment 
issues, it frequently has fallen back on the fair use doctrine and 
suggested, sometimes explicitly, that the fair use doctrine adequately 
protects any relevant First Amendment interests. In Eldred, for 
example, the Court determined that the fair use doctrine allows ample 
room for criticism, comment and parody, and that independent First 
Amendment review was therefore unnecessary.46 But the extent to 
which the fair use doctrine can be counted on to protect First 
Amendment interests, perhaps always to some extent overstated, is 
now in serious doubt. 
 
Act does not cover downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives); see also 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1008 (2006). 
 44. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 139–47 (2004). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220–21 (2003). 
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Two related trends in fair use law over the last twenty-some years 
have worked together to loosen fair use from whatever First 
Amendment core it once had. First, the “fair use as a market failure” 
approach has degenerated fair use into a simple question of whether 
the defendant’s use might affect the market for the plaintiff’s work.47 
In other words, the law has increasingly embraced the view that fair 
use should be found only when the market cannot be counted on to 
clear transactions between the affected parties, possibly because 
transaction costs are too high.48 Second, the “effect on the market” 
factor has been viewed increasingly broadly, focusing now not only 
on the potential effect of the defendant’s use on the market for the 
plaintiff’s work in its original form, but also on the potential effect on 
hypothetical derivative markets the copyright owner has not even 
shown an inclination to exploit.49 
When this view of fair use predominates and the cost of exploiting 
derivative markets continues to fall because of advances in 
technology, it will only be an accident if fair use happens to track 
speech values. There is no good reason to believe that markets fail 
only in circumstances in which speech is valuable (except, perhaps in 
the parody context). If fair use has no normative premise other than 
market efficiency, it is likely to diverge from First Amendment 
values, making the Court’s reliance on fair use as a bulwark for 
speech values increasingly questionable.  
One very recent development illustrates this divergence well. The 
Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), a collective agency that acts as 
an intermediary between content owners and users, recently 
announced its development of a product that will allow faculty and 
 
 47. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of American Copyright Fair Use Cases 
(Working Paper), abstract available at http://bartonbeebe.com/workingpapers.htm 
(“Preliminary analysis confirms the widely-held belief that factor four (“the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”) is uniquely dispositive” of the 
fair use analysis) (draft on file with author). 
 48. Though she resists the association, the concept of fair use as a function of market 
failure originated with Wendy Gordon. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1600 (1982). For recent work showing her reluctance to embrace this mantle, see Wendy 
J. Gordon, The “Market Failure” and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 
82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002). 
 49. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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staff using Blackboard automatically to seek permission for their use 
of copyrighted material.50 The problem with this system is that many 
of the uses faculty and staff might make of copyrighted material 
would traditionally be regarded as classic examples of fair use. 
Teaching, scholarship, and research, for example, three of the uses of 
copyrighted materials faculty are most likely to make, are explicitly 
listed as examples of potential fair uses in the preamble of section 
107 of the Copyright Act.51 CCC’s program ignores the possibility of 
fair use and erects a market structure that presumes a requirement of 
licensing. Yet, in so doing, CCC may make it so; by creating a 
market for licensing of this material, CCC has a legitimate argument 
that this use should no longer qualify as fair use when done without 
permission.52 In such a case, the fair use doctrine might not 
adequately protect academics’ First Amendment interests.  
C. Restrictions on Commercial Speech Get Greater Scrutiny 
The final development is the increasing respect the Court has 
shown commercial speech, formerly the poor stepchild of First 
Amendment law. The Court first held that commercial advertising 
was constitutionally protected in its 1976 ruling in Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.53 Though 
 
 50. See Copyright.com, Blackboard, http://www.copyright.com/ccc/do/viewPage?page 
Code=i14 (last visited May 16, 2006). 
 51. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright. 
Id. 
 52. Cf. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that 
corporation’s unauthorized copying of scientific articles for its researchers was not fair use). 
This case arose in a corporate setting, of course, and is therefore distinguishable from potential 
academic uses. Nevertheless, the case turned significantly on the fact that there was a market 
for copies of individual articles, which CCC provided. For a general description of the problem 
of feedback of licensing practices into copyright law, see James Gibson, Risk Aversion and 
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law 3–21 (July 26, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, 
draft on file with author and available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=918871).  
 53. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a Virginia statute that prohibited 
pharmacists from advertising drug prices). 
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the Court “seemingly pulled back on that protection in the 1980s[, it] 
has been providing more and more protection [to commercial speech] 
since the early 1990s.”54 Particularly notable was the Court’s decision 
in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,55 which overturned Posadas 
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,56 a case 
that allowed legislatures to choose to regulate truthful, non-
misleading speech. In 44 Liquormart, Justice Stevens stated that a 
“state legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress 
truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes that the 
Posadas majority was willing to tolerate.”57  
Even more striking given commercial speech’s long pedigree as 
outcast, a plurality in 44 Liquormart was willing to jettison, at least in 
part, the controlling Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission test for evaluating restrictions on commercial 
speech.58 Justice Thomas suggested that, at least in some 
circumstances, any distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech should be abolished,59 and Justice Scalia 
indicated that he might be persuaded to make such a ruling in the 
future.60 Given the recent changes on the Court, it is entirely possible 
 
 54. Volokh, supra note 26, at 732. Cases in the 1990s contributing to this expansion 
include Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 
533 U.S. 525 (2001); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999); 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 
U.S. 476 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); and City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 55. 517 U.S. 484. 
 56. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
 57. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510. 
 58. In Central Hudson, the Court adopted a four-part analysis of commercial speech 
restrictions. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we 
must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For 
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and 
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 
Id. 
 59. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518–28. 
 60. Id. at 517–18. 
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that the Court will subject at least some commercial speech 
regulations to greater First Amendment scrutiny. 
A higher level of review, if it comes about, will likely have much 
more significant consequences for trademark protection than for 
copyright. Copyright has its own constitutional authority, and the 
Court in Eldred made clear that the IP clause confers immunity from 
First Amendment analysis, at least when copyright law takes its 
“traditional” form. Trademark protection, by contrast, is based on 
Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce and should be given 
no more weight than any other restrictions on commercial speech.  
Yet, trademark law often has not taken the First Amendment 
seriously because, courts have suggested, it restricts only deceptive 
commercial speech that lacks serious First Amendment value.61 And 
the Supreme Court has indeed indicated that deceptive commercial 
speech may be treated differently for First Amendment purposes.62 
But even if characterizing trademark law in such a manner exempts 
traditional trademark protection,63 it is not likely to answer 
 
 61. See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that “trademark law permissibly regulates misleading commercial 
speech”); see also World Wrestling Fed’n Entm’t, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 
2d 413, 430 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (same). 
 62. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984). 
Though false and misleading commercial speech could be deemed to represent a 
category of unprotected speech, the rationale for doing so would be essentially the 
same as that involved in the libel area, viz, there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact. Moreover, since a commercial advertiser usually seeks to 
disseminate information about a specific product or service he himself provides and 
presumably knows more about than anyone else, there is a minimal danger that 
governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill 
accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression. 
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 63. Eugene Volokh suggests that there is a potential distinction to be drawn between 
dilution laws and the types of advertising bans that the Court has struck down in its modern 
commercial speech cases. He suggests that those advertising laws restrict communication of 
factual information (i.e., the price of pharmaceuticals), while dilution laws restrict the use of 
trademarks as “part of the nonfactual (image-building, attention-grabbing, or simply amusing) 
component of the promotion.” Volokh, supra note 26, at 733. Though he makes clear that, as 
applied to noncommercial speech, such a distinction would not get dilution laws off the hook, 
the prospect of trademark proponents advancing such an argument is deeply ironic. For many 
years, commentators have argued that expansive trademark protection encourages and rewards 
inefficient advertising expenditures. Advertising, they argue, very often lacks serious 
informational value, and instead serves only a persuasive function that provides little or no 
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satisfactorily any objections to more recent doctrinal developments. 
Trademark law now targets a good deal of speech that is not 
deceptive. Consequently, at least some of modern trademark law 
would have to be judged like any other commercial speech 
regulation. And in Central Hudson, the Court stated that although the 
special nature of commercial speech may require less than strict 
review of its regulation, special concerns arise from “regulations that 
entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-
related policy.”64 Protection against dilution, for example, would 
seem to fall squarely within that area of concern—it prohibits the 
non-misleading use of particular words to pursue a clearly 
nonspeech-related commercial policy.65 
Additionally, trademark owners now frequently assert their rights 
against uses that, at the very least, blur the line between commercial 
and non-commercial uses.66 Unlike uses of a mark in connection with 
specific products or services, these uses comment on or transform the 
mark for some expressive purpose. Such uses are difficult to 
categorize as commercial or non-commercial, but to the extent they 
 
consumer benefit. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal 
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark 
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999). Supporters of trademark protection have consistently 
rejected such arguments, claiming that advertising promotes social welfare because it 
predominantly provides information to consumers and may signal quality. See, e.g., WILLIAM 
LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
173–74 (2003); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of Product 
Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986) (arguing that advertising investment alone can signal 
product quality even when the informational content of the ads is nothing). Thus, it would be 
quite ironic for supporters of trademark protection to resist First Amendment defenses by 
claiming that dilution protection does not restrict communication of information, but only of 
nonfactual content.  
 64. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 556 n.9 (1980).  
 65. The same difficulties apply, probably to an even greater extent, to the right of 
publicity and of trade secret protection, which traditionally have not required evidence of 
confusion or deception. The right of publicity targets unauthorized commercial uses of an 
individual’s identity, without regard to whether such uses cause any confusion. Likewise, 
several recent cases that impose restraints on third-party disclosure of trade secrets raise serious 
concerns that Eldred seems to leave open. See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, Paper Barred from Using 
Data, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 2006 (discussing injunction entered by California Superior Court 
barring a local newspaper from publishing information about a company’s clinical trials 
involving an experimental blood substitute, which the paper had acquired pursuant to the 
California Public Records Act). 
 66. See, for example, cases cited supra note 32. 
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are non-commercial and not deceptive, the conflict seems even 
greater. 
 Few courts have attempted to categorize these types of uses. 
Those that have generally have turned to the Supreme Court’s factors 
in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., considering: (1) whether 
the communication is an advertisement; (2) whether it refers to a 
specific product or service; and (3) whether the speaker has an 
economic motivation for the speech.67 Under this test, a variety of 
uses that have been condemned by courts might be protected. Take, 
for example, the parody advertisement that the defendants in 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications ran on the back of 
their humor magazine.68 There, the “Michelob Oily” ad was not a real 
advertisement, and referred to the Michelob product only for its 
parodic effect. The speaker surely was economically motivated, in 
much the same way that newspaper publishers and the producers of 
Saturday Night Live are commercially motivated. Yet, the ad also is 
clearly distinguishable from the situation that was trademark law’s 
traditional concern: uses by a competitor of a mark similar to the 
plaintiff’s for the purpose of identifying the source of the defendant’s 
own products or services.  
If the Supreme Court does begin to require greater scrutiny of 
trademark protection, courts will be forced to analyze cases like 
Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci in much different ways than they 
traditionally have. In addition to having to categorize the speech at 
issue, for example, courts will be constrained by Cohen v. California, 
which reasoned that restricting the ability to use particular words runs 
“a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”69 Perhaps the 
commercial speech cases can be distinguished in some instances or 
First Amendment concerns can be overcome in other ways,70 but 
subjecting trademark protection to greater scrutiny will at least 
require courts to engage the issue specifically.  
 
 67. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).  
 68. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995). 
 69. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
 70. See Volokh, supra note 26, at 733. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As I said near the beginning of this Article, my thesis is a modest 
one. I cannot predict that the Roberts Court will begin an IP/First 
Amendment revolution. But while the Rehnquist Court was not 
particularly concerned about the impact of intellectual protections on 
free speech, it left the door open to greater scrutiny. Given some of 
the recent developments within and without intellectual property law, 
courts that are more concerned about a conflict may reconsider their 
traditional reluctance to address the issue. 
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